A horse riding accident
Harris v Miller is one of the rare examples of successfully establishing negligence following a horsing accident. Such cases are notoriously difficult to win; the risk of injury being viewed by many as inherent in riding.
FACTS
When she was 14 years old, the Claimant fell off the Defendant’s horse and sustained paraplegia. The Claimant was the girlfriend of the Defendant’s son. All parties were relatively inexperienced riders although the Claimant had the most experience, being found to be ‘a competent novice’.
On almost all factual points the parties were “diametrically opposed”. The Claimant argued that the horse bucked while cantering on flat ground; the Defendant contended that the horse merely dipped its head while walking downhill.
There was “very little common ground on the crucial aspects relevant to liability” and the dispute covered: the circumstances of the purchase of the horse; the circumstances of the fall and its aftermath; the characteristics of the horse including her behavior on the day of the incident; and, the Claimant’s experience of riding, both actual and as described to the Defendant.
ISSUES
An action was originally brought in negligence and under the Animals Act 1971. In a nod to the longstanding criticism leveled at the Animals Act, HHJ Graham Wood QC noted that it was “to the relief of all concerned, including the court” that only negligence was pursued at trial. The Claimant did not pursue the statutory claim because, on the particular facts, a finding of negligence would have been necessary to succeed.
The principal legal issue was the scope of the duty of care. The Claimant argued that if the court accepted her version of events, it must follow that a fall was reasonably foreseeable on the basis of the behaviour manifested by the horse. The Defendant contended that this was insufficient: it was necessary to assess duty in the context of the Defendant’s knowledge of both the horse and the Claimant’s riding experience. In all the circumstances, said the Defendant, it was reasonable to permit the Claimant to ride the horse, especially given her claimed experience and previous interactions with the horse.
Although there was disagreement as to the scope of the duty of care, both experts and counsel agreed that liability would be ‘substantially if not completely’ determined by which factual account was preferred by the judge.
OUTCOME
The Claimant succeeded.
HHJ Graham Woods QC accepted the Defendant’s submission that he must consider her actual and constructive knowledge of both the horse and the rider. Nonetheless, permitting the Claimant to ride the horse was a breach of the Defendant’s duty.
The judge held that an ordinary and reasonably prudent owner would ensure she possessed sufficient knowledge of the horse and the intended rider so as to assess the risk involved in this inherently dangerous activity. In the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that the horse would be strong and difficult to control, and was likely to unseat a rider of the Claimant’s competence except in “the most benign of conditions”. The Defendant’s positive encouragement and condoning (if not instructing) a trot in an open field exposed the Claimant to a foreseeable risk of injury. Any doubt as to the nature of the horse was removed when the Claimant communicated insecurity to the Defendant. Not foreseeing the severity of injury was immaterial.
The Claimant was entitled to damages on a full liability basis, informally estimated to be around £3million.
COMMENTARY
For horse owners, Harris v Miller is a cautionary tale. Before permitting anybody to ride their horse, owners must make sufficient enquiries so as to satisfy themselves of the experience and capabilities of both horse and rider and the compatibility of the two. Crucially, horse owners should consider specialist insurance cover and the level needed. Ms Miller’s insurance cover is said to be insufficient for the likely sums involved, potentially leaving her facing “dire financial consequences”.
For lawyers, the key lesson is the importance of contemporaneous notes. In making findings of fact, HHJ Graham Wood QC placed much emphasis on diary entries created by the Claimant in the immediate aftermath of the incident. For example, the judge noted an inconsistency in the Claimant’s evidence as to the location of the incident. This matter was in dispute, and in a draft witness statement the Claimant appeared to agree with the Defendant’s position. In accepting the Claimant’s evidence, HHJ Graham Wood QC described the diary as “particularly important” as a demonstration of the previous and subsequent consistency of the Claimant.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the more detailed the contemporaneous note, the better. The judge determined that the degree of detail contained therein meant that fabrication was unlikely, notwithstanding the Claimant’s knowledge that lawyers were involved and the obvious self-interest for a 14 year old in downplaying her culpability following a serious accident.